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TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY FINGERPRINTS: THE THIRD CIRCUIT’S
APPROVAL OF DNA COLLECTION UPON ARREST
IN UNITED STATES v. MITCHELL
MEGAN POWNALL*
“Solving crimes by [DNA analysis] furthers the fundamental objectives
of the criminal justice system, helping to bring the guilty to justice
and protect the innocent, who might otherwise be wrongly
suspected or accused, through the prompt and certain
identification of the actual perpetrators.”1
I. INTRODUCTION
Byron Halsey was a factory worker living with his girlfriend and her
two children, Tina and Tyrone.2  Byron worked hard to support his family,
and he loved and treated Tina and Tyrone as his own.3  One tragic eve-
ning, the two children were discovered in the basement of their apartment
building, brutally murdered.4  Law enforcement arrested the loving father
figure and tried him for numerous crimes surrounding the deaths.5  De-
* J.D. candidate, May 2013, Villanova University School of Law.  This article is
dedicated to the memory of Robert Campos, who blindly encouraged my academic
career before it even began.  I would like to thank Rachel Zuraw whose comments
and feedback contributed greatly to the contents of this Article.  I would also like
to thank my family and friends for their unyielding love and support.  Specifically,
I would like to thank my parents, my grandmother, and Adam Wyss.
1. DNA-Sample Collection and Biological Evidence Preservation in the Fed-
eral Jurisdiction, 73 Fed. Reg. 74,932, 74,933 (Dec. 10, 2008) (to be codified at 28
C.F.R. pt. 28).
2. See Tina Kelley, DNA in Murders Frees Inmate After 19 Years, N.Y. TIMES, May
16, 2007, at B1 (describing Halsey’s life before arrest); see also Know the Cases: Byron
Halsey, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/Byron_
Halsey.php (last visited May 21, 2012) (summarizing Halsey’s story).
3. See Kelley, supra note 2 (“Margaret Urquhart, the victims’ mother, said in a
statement: ‘I knew Byron loved Tyrone and Tina.’”); see also Know the Cases: Byron
Halsey, supra note 2 (recounting how Halsey worked and raised his girlfriend’s chil-
dren as his own).
4. See Kelley, supra note 2 (documenting circumstances surrounding chil-
drens’ murder).  A repairman found the childrens’ bodies in the basement of the
boarding house where the family lived. See Know the Cases: Byron Halsey, supra note
2 (discussing children’s murder).  Tina, the seven-year-old daughter, was strangled
to death. See id.  The eight-year-old son, Tyrone, was killed by four nails that were
hammered into his head with a brick. See id.  Both bodies showed evidence of
sexual assault. See id.
5. See Know the Cases: Byron Halsey, supra note 2 (describing Halsey’s arrest and
charges against him).  After a thirty-hour interrogation, Halsey falsely confessed to
the murders and signed a written confession. See id.  This confession led police to
cease their investigation of the other suspect in the case, Clifton Hall, a neighbor
in Halsey’s apartment complex. See id.  Prosecutors charged Halsey with two
(763)
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spite an apparent lack of evidence, the jury found Byron guilty of felony
murder, aggravated assault, and child abuse and gave him two life
sentences plus twenty more years in prison.6  Thus, in addition to endur-
ing the loss of his two cherished children, Byron was blamed and wrongly
punished for their deaths.7  Nineteen years later, tears streamed down his
face as Byron listened to a judge tell him he was free to go.8  After serving
nearly two decades in prison, DNA evidence proved that the once diligent
caregiver spent nearly half of his life in prison for a crime he did not
commit.9  When asked what he would do, his attorney reported that “[h]e
said something about taking a bath . . . .  He hasn’t taken one in 20
years.”10
Byron Halsey owes his new life to developments in DNA technology.11
DNA evidence is a scientific tool that continues to develop and impact the
way the criminal justice system operates.12  But with such technological
advances come legal complications.13  In particular, critics have attacked
the use of DNA technology in law enforcement as a violation of the Fourth
counts of four separate crimes: felony murder, aggravated manslaughter, aggra-
vated sexual assault, and possession of a weapon. See id.
6. See id.  The jury also acquitted Halsey on several other charges, which made
him ineligible for the death penalty. See id.
7. See id. (outlining facts leading to Halsey’s conviction being overturned).
8. See Kelley, supra note 2 (“Mr. Halsey, who was handcuffed, sat crying silently
during the brief proceeding in Union County Superior Court before Judge Stuart
L. Peim.”).
9. See Know the Cases: Byron Halsey, supra note 2 (summarizing facts that over-
turned Halsey’s conviction).  Halsey contacted the Innocence Project, which was
able to conduct DNA testing on evidence from the crime scene in 2006. See id.
(recounting steps taken to free Halsey from prison).  The evidence, semen and
cigarette butts, implicated Clifton Hall in the death of the two children. See id.  At
the time, Hall was serving a prison sentence for three other sexual assaults. See id.
After conducting a reinvestigation, the prosecution announced they were drop-
ping all charges against Halsey. See id. (reporting on impact of new DNA evidence
supporting Halsey).  Consequently, Halsey was exonerated after serving nineteen
years in prison. See id.
10. See Kelley, supra note 2 (stating Halsey “was looking forward to one thing
in particular after being released. . . .  ‘[T]aking a bath.’”).
11. For further discussion of the role of DNA evidence in Halsey’s exonera-
tion, see supra notes 7–10 and accompanying text.  As of March 2012, the FBI
database of DNA samples (CODIS) contained 10,662,200 offender profiles and
423,000 more samples. See CODIS—NDIS Statistics, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/codis/ndis-statistics (last visited May 21, 2012)
(reporting statistical data contained in National DNA Index).  Also, according to
the FBI website, “[a]s of March 2012, CODIS has produced over 176,100 hits assist-
ing in more than 169,000 investigations.” Id.
12. For further discussion of the overall effect of DNA technology on crime
solving capabilities, see supra notes 7–11 and accompanying text.
13. For further discussion of previous challenges to constitutionality of DNA
profiling, see infra notes 39–54 and accompanying text.
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Amendment’s protection against unreasonable searches.14  Courts have
rejected such challenges, reasoning that DNA testing is simply the modern
version of the well-established practice of fingerprinting.15  Consistent
with that comparison, the Third Circuit’s recent opinion in United States v.
Mitchell16 expands on prior precedent by holding that the government
may collect DNA samples from all arrestees.17  In doing so, the Third Cir-
cuit left several critical questions unanswered that may prove problematic
in future litigation.18
This Brief discusses the precedent and policies underlying the Mitchell
court’s decision and provides an outline of issues left unresolved by the
opinion.19  Part II presents the development of the Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence leading up to the DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act,
including how courts have handled relevant issues in the past.20  Part III
evaluates the court’s analysis in Mitchell.21  Further, Part III discusses the
unresolved issues left by the ruling and offers practitioners guidance re-
garding future litigation in this area of the law.22  Finally, Part IV con-
cludes by addressing the overall impact of the Mitchell decision and its
importance within the Third Circuit.23
II. THE EVOLUTION OF CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO DNA EVIDENCE
Even the earliest forms of forensic crime solving were questioned
under the Constitution.24  Challengers looked to the Fourth Amendment
for protection against potential intrusion from developing technology like
14. For a discussion of cases addressing the constitutionality of taking and
analyzing DNA, and the different analyses applied by the circuit courts, see infra
notes 39–92 and accompanying text.
15. For a discussion of the analogy of DNA testing to fingerprinting, see infra
notes 34–38 and accompanying text.
16. 652 F.3d 387 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc).
17. See id. at 390 (holding DNA profiling of all individuals who are arrested or
detained does not violate Fourth Amendment).  For further discussion of previous
Fourth Amendment challenges to the DNA Act, see infra notes 39–92 and accom-
panying text.
18. For further discussion of likely issues for future litigation, see infra notes
137–68 and accompanying text.
19. For further discussion of these issues, see infra notes 138–69 and accom-
panying text.
20. For further discussion of the historical development of the Fourth
Amendment analysis of issues surrounding DNA evidence, see infra notes 24–111
and accompanying text.
21. For further discussion of the Third Circuit’s analysis in Mitchell, see infra
notes 116–37 and accompanying text.
22. For further discussion of issues relevant to future practice of law, see infra
notes 138–69 and accompanying text.
23. For further discussion of the overall impact of Mitchell, see infra notes
170–78 and accompanying text.
24. For an explanation of the early history of Fourth Amendment challenges
to fingerprinting evidence, see infra notes 29–38 and accompanying text.
3
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fingerprints and mug shots.25  With the advent of DNA testing, these
Fourth Amendment challenges grew in number and scope.26  Statutes and
case law began to reflect the importance society placed on DNA profiling
in criminal investigation.27  Nonetheless, as DNA testing continued to
evolve, many began to question how far the Fourth Amendment would let
criminal investigation expand.28
A. Early Crime-Solving and the Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment guarantees protection “against unreasonable
searches and seizures . . . .”29  The Supreme Court’s definition of reasona-
bleness is best described by its opinion in United States v. Jones,30 and by
Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Katz v. United States,31 to the extent it re-
mains good law following Jones.32  Under Jones, Fourth Amendment pro-
tection “embod[ies] a particular concern for government trespass upon
the areas (‘persons, houses, papers, and effects’) it enumerates” and also
seemingly extends to circumstances in which individuals have a “reasona-
ble expectation of privacy” as expressed by Justice Harlan in Katz.33
25. For further discussion of early crime solving techniques and Fourth Amend-
ment challenges to them, see infra notes 29–38 and accompanying text.
26. For a discussion of challenges to DNA testing and DNA profiling laws, see
infra notes 48–50, 93–97 and accompanying text; for examples of these challenges,
see infra notes 39–111 and accompanying text.
27. For a discussion of DNA profiling laws and public policies behind them,
see infra notes 39–43, 52–54 and accompanying text.  DNA profiling as referred to
in this article means the collection and analysis of DNA samples within the CODIS
system.  For an explanation of the DNA profiles created within CODIS, see infra
note 47.
28. For examples of challenges to DNA laws, see infra notes 58–92, 98–111
and accompanying text.
29. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated . . . .”).
30. 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
31. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
32. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949–52 (“As explained, for most of our history the
Fourth Amendment was understood to embody a particular concern for govern-
ment trespass upon the areas (‘persons, houses, papers, and effects’) it enumer-
ates. Katz did not repudiate that understanding.” (footnote omitted)).
33. See id. at 950–52 (“[T]he Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test has
been added to, not substituted for, the common-law trespassory test.”).  In addressing
reasonableness, the Court has historically endorsed a balancing test.
See United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118–19 (2001) (“The touchstone of the
Fourth Amendment is reasonableness, and the reasonableness of a search is deter-
mined ‘by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an
individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the
promotion of legitimate governmental interests.’” (quoting Wyoming v. Hough-
ton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999))).  For a helpful pre-Jones discussions of the Fourth
Amendment’s application to DNA evidence, see Aaron B. Chapin, Note, Arresting
DNA: Privacy Expectations of Free Citizens Versus Post-Convicted Persons and the Unconsti-
tutionality of DNA Dragnets, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1842, 1848–49 (2005); Paul M.
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Fingerprinting was one of the first major developments in crime solv-
ing that raised questions about an individual’s Fourth Amendment
rights.34  While law enforcement agencies have used fingerprinting for
over a century, the practice began in a time when individuals could easily
hide their identity.35  The collection of fingerprints generated only a few
challenges and has long since been established as routine procedure.36  In
today’s society, where identity and fingerprints may easily be concealed
with the aid of technology, an apt analogy has developed between finger-
printing and DNA samples.37  Accordingly, the use of DNA evidence by
law enforcement has even been termed “fingerprints for the twenty-first
century.”38
Monteleoni, Note, DNA Databases, Universality, and the Fourth Amendment, 82 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 247, 261 (2007).
34. See infra note 36 (showing example of past constitutional challenges to
fingerprinting).
35. See Corey Preston, Note, Faulty Foundations: How the False Analogy to Routine
Fingerprinting Undermines the Argument for Arrestee DNA Sampling, 19 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 475, 477 (2010) (describing importance of fingerprinting during its
early emergence as crime solving tool).
36. See id. at 507 (chronicling development of routine practice of fingerprint-
ing).  Fingerprinting came under constitutional fire in Davis v. Mississippi. See Da-
vis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 723 (1969) (challenging validity of fingerprinting
evidence); see also Preston, supra note 35, at 508 (describing facts of case).  In Da-
vis, police officers fingerprinted a large sample of local youths after a woman said
she was raped by an “African American youth.” See Davis, 394 U.S. at 722.  During
review by the Supreme Court, the Court found the fingerprint evidence inadmissi-
ble due to the possibility of harassment. See id. (explaining dangers of fingerprint-
ing mass amounts of potential suspects).  Looking at the case, commentator Corey
Preston wrote, “[t]his intuition in Davis towards suppressing evidence that is
gained from a broad criminal investigative purpose, or searches lacking individual-
ized suspicion, has been consistently reaffirmed by the Court.”  Preston, supra note
35, at 508 (footnote omitted).
37. See United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387, 410 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc)
(analogizing DNA to fingerprints), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1741 (2012).
38. See id. (“[W]e conclude that a DNA profile is used solely as an accurate,
unique, identifying marker—in other words, as fingerprints for the twenty-first
century.”).  The Supreme Court of Virginia in Anderson v. Commonwealth wrote ex-
tensively on the use of this analogy. See Anderson v. Commonwealth, 650 S.E.2d
702, 705 (Va. 2007) (“The analogous treatment of the taking of DNA samples to
the taking of fingerprints has been widely accepted.”).  The Supreme Court of
Virginia cited to several courts, including the Third Circuit. See id. (citing analo-
gies used in Second, Third, Fourth, and Ninth Circuit courts).  The court wrote,
“[t]he Third Circuit held that ‘[t]he governmental justification for [DNA] identifi-
cation . . . relies on no argument different in kind from that traditionally advanced
for taking fingerprints and photographs, but with additional force because of the
potentially greater precision of DNA sampling and matching methods.’” Id. (alter-
ations in original) (citing United States v. Sczubelek, 402 F.3d 175, 185–86 (3d Cir.
2005)).  For further analysis of Sczubelek, see infra notes 85–92 and accompanying
text; for a full discussion of Anderson, see infra notes 107–11 and accompanying
text.
5
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B. The Advent of DNA Collection
Courts have reasoned that DNA testing is part of the natural evolution
of crime solving technology.39  Recognizing the importance of DNA evi-
dence, Congress passed legislation in 1994 that allowed the FBI to create a
DNA database known as the Combined DNA Index System (CODIS).40
The purpose of CODIS was to allow the comparison and sharing of DNA
samples among state and local laboratories in an effort to enhance crime
solving capabilities.41  Congress took action to physically obtain DNA sam-
ples in 2000 by passing the DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 2000
(“DNA Act” or the “Act”).42  Under the DNA Act, law enforcement offi-
cials must obtain DNA from “each individual in the custody of the Bureau
of Prisons who is, or has been, convicted of a qualifying Federal offense”
and any “individual on probation, parole, or supervised release.”43
In an effort to preempt constitutional challenges, Congress built pro-
tections into the Act that provide safeguards for individual rights.44  For
example, the Act limits both who can have access to DNA samples and how
the samples may be used.45  The Act also provides a process for expunging
a DNA sample from CODIS in the event of acquittal or dismissal.46  Fi-
39. See Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 410 (arguing DNA today is what fingerprints were
in early twentieth century); see also Anderson, 650 S.E.2d at 705 (using idea that
DNA is part of natural progression in technology); Preston, supra note 35, at
475–76 (explaining use of analogy that DNA sampling is natural evolution of rou-
tine fingerprinting when it comes to identification technology).
40. See DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C.
§ 14135a(a)(3) (2006) (codifying congressional authorization to create CODIS
database for DNA samples); see also Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 399 (discussing congres-
sional enactment of Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act that gave
FBI power to establish CODIS).
41. See § 14135a (outlining process for creating DNA profile within CODIS);
see also Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 399 (“[CODIS] allows State and local forensics labora-
tories to exchange and compare DNA profiles electronically in an attempt to link
evidence from crime scenes for which there are no suspects to DNA samples of
convicted offenders on file in the system.” (quoting H.R. Rep. 106-900(I), at 8
(2000), reprinted in 2000 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2323, 2324)).
42. See § 14135a (permitting physical collection of DNA from specific crimi-
nal offenders).
43. § 14135a(a)(1)-(2).
44. See generally DNA-Sample Collection and Biological Evidence Preservation
in the Federal Jurisdiction, 73 Fed. Reg. 74,932, 74,933–41 (Dec. 10, 2008) (codi-
fied at 28 C.F.R. pt. 28) (presenting safeguards and policy reasons behind each
provision of DNA Act).
45. See § 14135a(a)(4)(A) (“The Attorney General, the Director of the Bu-
reau of Prisons, or the probation office responsible (as applicable) may use or
authorize the use of such means . . . to detain, restrain, and collect a DNA sam-
ple . . . .”).  The text of the DNA Act protects the integrity of the sample by severely
limiting the sampling and profiling procedure. See id. § 14135a(b) (stating each
sample collected shall be furnished to FBI for DNA analysis and inclusion in
CODIS).
46. See DNA-Sample Collection and Biological Evidence Preservation in the
Federal Jurisdiction, 73 Fed. Reg. at 74,932 (explaining expunging process).
Under the DNA Act, a person can petition to have his or her sample removed from
6
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 57, Iss. 4 [2012], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol57/iss4/5
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\57-4\VLR405.txt unknown Seq: 7  5-DEC-12 12:10
2012] CASEBRIEF 769
nally, the type of DNA used in the creation of a CODIS profile is a se-
quence of DNA known as “junk DNA,” which cannot be used to
independently identify the source of the sample.47
However, the Act’s safeguards did not shield the statute from constitu-
tional attack.48  The DNA Act has consistently faced criticism as enabling
unreasonable, and thus unconstitutional, searches.49  The Supreme Court
laid the framework for these challenges when it ruled that the “compelled
intrusion” of extracting blood for blood alcohol testing constituted a
search under the Fourth Amendment.50  This decision, however, did not
negate the Court’s prior justification of blood testing as only a minimal
intrusion on individual rights.51
CODIS if an individual’s conviction has been overturned, if charges were dis-
missed, if no charges were filed, or if that individual was acquitted. See § 14132(d).
This process requires the individual to obtain a final court order establishing the
factual basis for requesting expungement. See id.
47. See DNA-Sample Collection and Biological Evidence Preservation in the
Federal Jurisdiction, 73 Fed. Reg. at 74,932 (explaining process for creating “ge-
netic fingerprints”).  The Department of Justice explains that the DNA entered
into CODIS is “information concerning 13 ‘core loci[ ]’ amount[ing] to ‘genetic
fingerprints’ that can be used to identify an individual uniquely, but do not dis-
close an individual’s traits, disorders, or dispositions.” Id. at 47,933.  The Ninth
Circuit in United States v. Kincade described the process of creating the CODIS pro-
file, writing:
Through the use of short tandem repeat technology (“STR”), the Bureau
analyzes the presence of various alleles located at 13 markers (or loci) on
DNA present in the specimen.  These STR loci are each found on so-
called “junk DNA”—that is, non-genic stretches of DNA not presently rec-
ognized as being responsible for trait coding—and “were purposely se-
lected because they are not associated with any known physical or
medical characteristics.” . . .  Due to the substantial number of alleles
present at each of the 13 STR loci . . . and wide-spread variances in their
representation among human beings, the chance that two randomly se-
lected individuals will share the same profile are infinitesimal—as are the
chances that a person randomly selected from the population at large will
present the same DNA profile as that drawn from crime-scene evidence.
United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 818–19 (9th Cir. 2004) (footnote omitted)
(citation omitted).
48. For discussion of the safeguards built into the DNA Act, see supra notes
44–47 and accompanying text; for a summary of challenges to the DNA Act, see
infra notes 58–92, 98–111 and accompanying text.
49. See United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387, 402 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc)
(“The DNA Act and its state-law analogues have been subject to numerous consti-
tutional challenges, generally on the ground that DNA collection and analysis is an
unreasonable search in violation of the Fourth Amendment.”), cert. denied, 132 S.
Ct. 1741 (2012).  For more cases challenging the constitutionality of the DNA Act,
see infra notes 58–92, 98–111 and accompanying text.
50. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 616 (1989) (“We have
long recognized that a ‘compelled intrusio[n] into the body for blood to be ana-
lyzed for alcohol content’ must be deemed a Fourth Amendment search.” (altera-
tion in original) (quoting Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767–68 (1966))).
51. See Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 436 (1957) (explaining blood tests
are part of everyday life which amount to only minimal intrusion); see also Kincade,
379 F.3d at 836–37 (citing Abram as law applicable to today’s jurisprudence).
7
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Every circuit court faced with a Fourth Amendment challenge has up-
held the constitutionality of the original DNA Act.52  Despite the frequent
litigation, the circuit courts are split as to the proper analytical test to ap-
ply to these Fourth Amendment challenges.53  Courts have developed two
distinct tests for these Fourth Amendment issues: the “special needs test”
and a “totality of the circumstances test.”54
1. Special Needs Test
A minority of circuit courts have adopted what is known as the special
needs test.55  Under a special needs analysis, a court considers the purpose
served by a warrantless search.56  If the search was conducted for purposes
unrelated to law enforcement, and a warrant or finding of probable cause
would have been unreasonable under the circumstances, the search is
within the Fourth Amendment exception.57
The Second Circuit applied the special needs test to the 2000 DNA
Act in United States v. Amerson.58  The court determined DNA collection
aided law enforcement in identifying individuals.59  However, according
to the court, this was not a law enforcement purpose because DNA collec-
tion “does not involve any suggestion that the individual is being suspected
of having committed a crime (other than the one of which he had already
been convicted).”60  Further, the court found DNA testing to be a “spe-
cial” need because it is beyond the scope of “normal” law enforcement
52. See Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 402 (referring to other circuit courts upholding
DNA indexing statutes under Constitution); see also Ashley Eiler, Note, Arrested De-
velopment: Reforming the Federal All-Arrestee DNA Collection Statute to Comply with the
Fourth Amendment, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1201, 1213 (2011) (discussing prior hold-
ings of circuits throughout United States).  For a discussion of cases challenging
the constitutionality of the DNA Act, see infra notes 58–92, 98–111 and accompa-
nying text.
53. See Eiler, supra note 52, at 1213 (summarizing contrasting tests used to
review Fourth Amendment challenges throughout circuit courts).
54. See infra notes 55–57, 63–66 and accompanying text (explaining provi-
sions of special needs and totality of circumstances tests).
55. See Eiler, supra note 52, at 1213–16 (“The minority approach adopted by
federal circuit courts examines whether the DNA collection statute being consid-
ered presents a ‘special need’ beyond normal law enforcement needs that renders
the ‘warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable.’”).
56. See United States v. Amerson, 483 F.3d 73, 80 (2d Cir. 2007) (describing
special needs test as looking at relationship between need and law enforcement).
57. See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987) (explaining that war-
rantless searches are justified when probable cause and warrant are impracticable);
see also United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 823 (9th Cir. 2004) (explaining
most special needs cases involve searches in special non-law enforcement circum-
stances, like preserving school setting).
58. 483 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 2007).
59. See id. at 82 (summarizing analysis of DNA Act under special needs test).
60. See id. (justifying DNA Act as beyond law enforcement purposes because it
does not involve suspecting individual of criminal activity).
8
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activity.61  Accordingly, the court upheld the DNA Act as constitutionally
valid.62
2. Totality of the Circumstances Test
The majority of the circuit courts, including the Third Circuit, have
adopted a totality of the circumstances test to analyze challenges to the
DNA Act.63  The Fourth Amendment’s totality of the circumstances test is
a balancing test that requires courts to compare the intrusion on individ-
ual privacy with the government interests furthered by that intrusion.64
This test is built on the Supreme Court’s holding in Samson v. California,65
which weighed an arrestee’s expectation of privacy against compelling gov-
ernment interests.66
Several circuit courts have applied the totality of the circumstances
test to DNA testing statutes.67  One of the initial cases appeared in the
Ninth Circuit in Rise v. Oregon.68  In Rise, the court addressed the constitu-
tionality of a state law mandating DNA testing for certain criminal offend-
ers.69  The court began its analysis by clarifying that information derived
from a DNA sample is analogous to that from a fingerprint, in that both
are “identifying marker[s] unique to the individual from whom the infor-
61. See id. (arguing DNA testing is not something normal law enforcement
methodologies utilize and is therefore within special need).
62. See id. at 88 (concluding DNA Act satisfies special needs test).
63. See Eiler, supra note 52, at 1213–14 (commenting on use of totality of
circumstances test throughout majority of circuits).
64. See Preston, supra note 35, at 479 (“The ‘totality of the circumstance’ test
requires balancing the degree of intrusion on an individual’s privacy and the legiti-
mate government interest that that intrusion serves.”).
65. 547 U.S. 843 (2006).  In Samson, the Supreme Court held that, under the
totality of the circumstances, a parolee can be subject to search or seizure by an
officer of the law without warrant or cause. See id. (discussing application and
outcome of case).
66. See id. at 848 (adopting totality of circumstances test for Fourth Amend-
ment challenges); see also Eiler, supra note 52, at 1214 (describing Supreme Court
precedent in Samson).  Courts that apply the totality of the circumstances test often
point to the government’s law enforcement interests. See id. at 1214–15 (outlining
government interests served by CODIS).  These interests include the ability to: re-
habilitate parolees and releasees; efficiently and accurately solve crimes; and exon-
erate the wrongly convicted. See United States v. Weikert, 504 F.3d 1, 1 (1st Cir.
2007) (presenting arguments in favor of government interests); United States v.
Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 838 (9th Cir. 2004) (showing government interests which
tip totality of circumstances test in favor of government); Eiler, supra note 52, at
1214 (describing government interests).
67. For other cases examining the constitutionality of the 2000 DNA Act, see
infra notes 68–92 and accompanying text.
68. 59 F.3d 1556 (9th Cir. 1995).  Prior to the case addressing the constitu-
tionality of the statute, the challenger was convicted of attempted murder. See id.
at 1558 (discussing Fourth Amendment challenges to state law mandating DNA
collection and summarizing facts of previous case).
69. See id. (restating provisions of Oregon DNA law requiring DNA testing of
convicted murderers and sexual offenders).
9
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mation is derived.”70  After applying the totality of the circumstances test,
the court upheld the constitutional validity of the state statute.71  The
court explained that convicted criminals have a diminished right to pri-
vacy that is outweighed by the wider societal benefit of the statute.72
Building on this precedent, the Ninth Circuit applied the same analy-
sis to the DNA Act in United States v. Kincade.73  The defendant in Kincade
was serving a period of supervised release when his probation officer re-
quested a blood sample.74  The defendant refused and challenged the
constitutionality of the DNA Act in court.75  The court began its analysis
by extending the principles of the diminished privacy expectation, ac-
knowledged in Rise, to parolees and conditional releasees.76  The court
further reasoned that both the blood sample and the information con-
tained therein were only minimal intrusions into individual privacy.77  To
complete its evaluation of the Act, the court found that the societal con-
cerns of monitoring and rehabilitating parolees were valid government in-
70. Id. at 1559.
71. See id. at 1560, 1562 (applying totality of circumstances test to determine
law was reasonable and constitutional).  While the court did not explicitly acknowl-
edge that it was applying a totality of the circumstances or balancing test, it stated
that the issue “requires us to balance the gravity of the public interest served by the
creation of a DNA data bank, the degree to which the data bank would advance
the public interest, and the severity of the resulting interference with individual
liberty.” Id. at 1560.
72. See id. at 1560, 1562 (explaining convicted criminals do not have same
privacy rights as other citizens, and outlining public policy concerns which led
court to its holding).  When analyzing the government interests served by the DNA
sampling, the court looked at crime solving interests such as identifying suspects,
prosecuting offenders, and the benefit to the prosecution of increased accuracy in
identifying criminal offenders. See id. at 1561 (outlining public policies addressed
by DNA sampling law).
73. See United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 836 (9th Cir. 2004) (“In evalu-
ating the totality of the circumstances, we must balance the degree to which DNA
profiling interferes with the privacy interests of qualified federal offenders against
the significance of the public interest served by such profiling.”).
74. See id. at 820 (summarizing facts of case).
75. See id. (discussing facts leading up to defendant’s constitutional
challenge).
76. See id. at 833 (“[P]arolees and other conditional releasees are not entitled
to the full panoply of rights and protections possessed by the general public.”).
77. See id. at 837–38 (finding intrusions caused by DNA Act only minimal).
The court first relied on Supreme Court precedent, which found that invasions
caused by blood tests are minimal. See id. at 837 (discussing analysis from
Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957)).  Then, the court determined the DNA
sample only makes a record of the offender’s identity, nothing more. See id. at
837–38.  In conclusion, the court wrote, “[a]s currently structured and imple-
mented, however, the DNA Act’s compulsory profiling of qualified federal offend-
ers can only be described as minimally invasive—both in terms of the bodily
intrusion it occasions, and the information it lawfully produces.” Id. at 838.
10
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terests.78  Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit upheld the constitutionality of
the DNA Act.79
The First Circuit examined the validity of the DNA Act in United States
v. Weikert.80  The challenger in Weikert opposed the taking of DNA upon
his conditional release from prison.81  The court relied on Supreme Court
precedent, and applied the totality of the circumstances test.82  Following
the approach of the Ninth Circuit, the First Circuit held the DNA Act to
be constitutional when applied to individuals on conditional release.83
The court found that the public policy concerns outweighed any violation
of the rights of an individual on conditional release.84
The Third Circuit undertook a Fourth Amendment challenge to the
2000 DNA Act in United States v. Sczubelek.85  In Sczubelek, the challenger was
a person on supervised release who protested a warrantless DNA extrac-
tion.86  The court applied the totality of the circumstances test and found
no constitutional violation.87  First, the court reasoned that the intrusion
caused by a blood test is minimal.88  Second, the court noted that an indi-
78. See id. at 838–39 (explaining benefits of DNA testing such as monitoring
parolees and providing closure to victims).
79. See id. at 839 (“In light of conditional releasees’ substantially diminished
expectation of privacy, the minimal intrusion occasioned by blood sampling, and
the overwhelming societal interests so clearly furthered by the collection of DNA
information from convicted offenders, we must conclude that compulsory DNA
profiling of qualified federal offenders is reasonable under the totality of the
circumstances.”).
80. See United States v. Weikert, 504 F.3d 1, 2–3 (1st Cir. 2007) (“This case
presents a question of first impression in this circuit: is it a violation of the Fourth
Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures to require an
individual on supervised release to provide a blood sample for purposes of creat-
ing a DNA profile and entering it into a centralized database?”).
81. See id. (summarizing facts of case).
82. See id. at 11 (laying out applicable precedent and determining totality of
circumstances test was appropriate).
83. See id. at 11–18 (holding DNA sampling and profiling to be constitution-
ally valid).  The First Circuit followed the analysis applied by other courts, balanc-
ing the small invasion of the blood sample with valid public policy concerns
addressed by the sampling. See id. (summarizing history and precedent court used
when applying totality of circumstances test).
84. See id. (affirming holding in case).
85. See United States v. Sczubelek, 402 F.3d 175, 177 (3d Cir. 2005) (ruling on
constitutionality of collecting DNA samples from people on supervised release).
86. See id. (reiterating issue in case).
87. See id. (“The government’s interest in building a DNA database for identi-
fication purposes, similar to its interest in maintaining fingerprint records, out-
weighs the minimal intrusion into a criminal offender’s diminished expectation of
privacy.”).
88. See id. at 184 (citing Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass’n, 469 U.S. 602, 616
(1989)).  For a full discussion of Skinner, see infra notes 120–21 and accompanying
text.
11
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vidual on supervised release has a lesser right to privacy in their identity,
and DNA is merely a more reliable means of identification.89
Additionally, the court emphasized that DNA databases promote ac-
curacy in criminal investigations and, consequently, protect society.90  Af-
ter examining the competing interests, the court found the benefit to
society outweighed the burden on the individual.91  While both tests are
applied amongst the circuit courts, the majority favor the totality of the
circumstances test.92
C. DNA and Arrestees
In an effort to further improve crime solving capabilities, Congress
extended the collection of DNA with a 2006 amendment to the DNA Act
(“2006 DNA Act”).93  Under this amendment, law enforcement officials
are required to obtain DNA samples from all individuals who are arrested,
facing charges, or facing convictions.94  Federal regulation implements
the federal statute, which mandates DNA collection and leaves no discre-
tion on the part of the law enforcement officer.95  A vast array of court
cases and scholarly literature have targeted the 2000 DNA Act, but the
newest addition to the Act has produced less commentary.96  The Su-
preme Court has been silent on the issue, and prior to Mitchell, only one
circuit reviewed a case challenging the 2006 amendment.97
89. See id. at 185 (describing lower level of liberty given to individuals on su-
pervised release).  The court found that once the defendant was convicted of a
felony, his identity became a state interest. See id.  That interest was served by cre-
ating a permanent record, including: fingerprints, photographs, and DNA. See id.
(outlining booking procedures that serve legitimate state interest in identifying
criminals).
90. See id. at 185–86 (explaining compelling government interests served by
DNA collection and maintaining DNA database).
91. See id. (holding that government interests outweighed minimal burden on
individual rights).
92. For a discussion of the use of the totality of the circumstances test to ana-
lyze DNA Act challenges, see supra notes 64–92 and accompanying text.
93. See 42 U.S.C. § 14135a (2006) (extending 2000 DNA Act to allow DNA
sampling of all arrestees); see also United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387, 390 (3d
Cir. 2011) (en banc) (describing most recent amendments to DNA Act), cert. de-
nied, 132 S. Ct. 1741 (2012).
94. See generally DNA-Sample Collection and Biological Evidence Preservation
in Federal Jurisdiction, 73 Fed. Reg. 74,932 (Dec. 10, 2008) (codified at 28 C.F.R.
pt. 28) (explaining policies and provisions of 2006 DNA Act).
95. See 28 C.F.R. § 28.12 (2009) (“Any agency of the United States that arrests
or detains individuals or supervises individuals facing charges shall collect DNA
samples from individuals who are arrested, facing charges, or convicted . . . .”); see
also Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 401 (explaining mandatory nature of DNA collection).
96. For a full discussion of constitutional challenges to the 2000 DNA Act, see
supra notes 63–92 and accompanying text.
97. See United States v. Pool, 621 F.3d 1213, 1214 (9th Cir. 2010) (reviewing
constitutionality of DNA Act’s 2006 amendment), rehearing en banc granted, 646
F.3d 659 (9th Cir. 2011), vacated as moot, 59 F.3d 761 (9th Cir. 2011); see also Eiler,
12
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In United States v. Pool,98 the Ninth Circuit reviewed the 2006 amend-
ment.99  While the Ninth Circuit has since vacated its opinion after the
defendant entered a guilty plea, the court’s analysis is still noteworthy as
the first to review the 2006 amendments to the DNA Act.100  In Pool, the
defendant’s pretrial release was contingent on providing a DNA sam-
ple.101  The defendant argued that arrestees have the same rights as nor-
mal citizens.102  The court rejected this argument and determined
probable cause for arrest set an arrestee apart from the average popula-
tion.103  The court then applied the totality of the circumstances test to
the Fourth Amendment challenge.104  After weighing both sides, the court
found the state’s legitimate interest in identifying arrestees outweighed
the defendant’s diminished expectation of privacy in his identity.105  The
court reasoned that DNA was simply a more accurate means of identifica-
tion that served the state’s interest, and upheld the newly modified DNA
Act.106
While Pool was the only federal case to examine the 2006 amendments
prior to Mitchell, the Supreme Court of Virginia did so in Anderson v. Com-
monwealth.107  In Anderson, the defendant challenged DNA testing upon
arrest after his DNA matched a sample taken in a rape case twelve years
earlier.108  The court determined that taking DNA was no different than
providing a fingerprint, an analogy that is widely accepted amongst the
supra, note 52, at 1202–03 (summarizing lack of review of any statutorily mandated
DNA sampling by Supreme Court).
98. 621 F.3d 1213 (9th Cir. 2010), rehearing en banc granted, 646 F.3d 659 (9th
Cir. 2011), vacated as moot, 659 F.3d 761 (9th Cir. 2011).
99. See generally id. (ruling on question of whether all arrestee DNA testing in
2006 DNA Act is constitutional).
100. See United States v. Pool, 646 F.3d 659 (9th Cir. 2011), rehearing en banc
granted, 646 F.3d 659 (9th Cir. 2011), vacated as moot, 659 F.3d 761 (9th Cir. 2011).
101. See Pool, 621 F.3d at 1215 (summarizing facts of case).
102. See id. at 1219 (summarizing defendant’s argument that his Fourth
Amendment rights, which he shared with normal population, were violated).
103. See id. (“[Probable cause] was the ‘watershed event’ that distinguished
Pool from the general public and allowed for the application of the totality of the
circumstances test.”).
104. See id. at 1217 (deciding to apply totality of circumstances test to analyze
defendant’s challenge).
105. See id. at 1217, 1219 (holding arrestees have diminished expectation of
privacy upon finding of probable cause for arrest, and once individuals are ar-
rested their identity becomes matter of state interest).
106. See id. at 1222–23 (explaining use of DNA as most accurate way to deter-
mine identity).
107. 650 S.E.2d 702, 703 (Va. 2007) (reviewing constitutionality of sampling
all individuals placed under arrest).  Although Anderson is a state rather than a
federal case, it has been important to the development of this area of law because
it is one of two cases to have addressed the constitutionality of the DNA Act at that
time. See id. (describing lack of jurisprudence).
108. See id. at 704 (summarizing facts of case).
13
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state and federal courts.109  Applying this reasoning, the Supreme Court
of Virginia determined that the minor intrusion upon an arrestee’s privacy
was far outweighed by the state’s law enforcement interests.110  Accord-
ingly, the court held that taking DNA samples is “analogous to the taking
of a suspect’s fingerprints upon arrest and [is] not an unlawful search
under the Fourth Amendment.”111
III. ANALYSIS
Prior to Mitchell, only the Ninth Circuit in Pool and the Supreme
Court of Virginia in Anderson had undertaken constitutional review of the
2006 DNA Act.112  As the second federal circuit court to review the consti-
tutionality of the 2006 DNA Act, the Third Circuit built on precedent sur-
rounding the original DNA Act.113  Citing public policy concerns and its
own prior decisions, the court ultimately upheld the 2006 DNA Act.114
However, the issues that Mitchell left untouched warrant just as much at-
tention as the precedential opinion.115
A. Upholding the Constitutionality of All Arrestee DNA Testing
To begin its analysis of the 2006 DNA Act, the Third Circuit adopted
the totality of the circumstances test.116  Citing its use of the test in
Sczubelek, the court determined that the test is applicable beyond searches
of probationers and parolees.117  Balancing the competing individual and
109. See id. at 705 (“Upon arrest, the accused is subject to a routine booking
process, including the taking of fingerprints.  A DNA sample of the accused taken
upon arrest, while more revealing, is no different in character than acquiring fin-
gerprints upon arrest.”).  For a full discussion of the analogy of DNA to finger-
prints, see supra note 38.
110. See id. at 704–07 (analyzing balance of arrestee’s privacy interest against
state’s interest in improved law enforcement).
111. Id. at 706.
112. For further discussion of Pool, see supra notes 98–106 and accompanying
text; for a further discussion of Anderson, see supra notes 107–11 and accompany-
ing text.
113. See infra notes 116–37 and accompanying text (summarizing Third Cir-
cuit’s arguments and reasoning).
114. See infra notes 116–37 and accompanying text (discussing court’s basis
for upholding 2006 DNA Act).
115. For discussion of the unresolved issues presented in Mitchell and their
overall significance in the Third Circuit, see infra notes 138–69 and accompanying
text.
116. See United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387, 390 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc)
(“[W]e apply a ‘totality of the circumstances’ test, balancing the intrusion on
Mitchell’s privacy against the Government’s interest in the collection and testing of
his DNA.”), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1741 (2012).
117. See id. at 390, 403 (explaining use of totality of circumstances test).  The
court determined that the totality of the circumstances test applied to Mitchell’s
situation by relying on Supreme Court precedent from Tennessee v. Garner. See id.
at 403 (citing Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985)).  In Garner, the Supreme
Court wrote that the “key principle” in Fourth Amendment analysis, and determin-
14
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governmental interests aided the court in analyzing the reasonableness of
the DNA sampling.118  More specifically, the court concluded that to de-
termine the reasonableness of DNA testing under the circumstances in-
volved balancing the intrusion of privacy against government interests in
collecting and testing DNA.119
The totality of the circumstances test led the court to split its analysis
of DNA collection into two searches: the physical collection of the DNA
and the processing of the DNA sample.120  The court began its analysis by
asserting that collecting DNA constitutes a search under the Fourth
Amendment.121  Regarding the collection of the DNA sample, the court
relied on Supreme Court precedent, as they did in Sczubelek, to determine
that blood tests constitute a minimal intrusion of privacy.122  By applying
its analysis in Sczubelek, the court concluded that “the act of collecting a
DNA sample is ‘neither a significant nor an unusual intrusion.’”123
Applying the totality of the circumstances test to the processing of the
DNA sample, the court quickly rejected Mitchell’s argument that DNA is
not comparable to fingerprints.124  While the lower court agreed with
Mitchell’s assertion that DNA contains more information than just iden-
tity, the Third Circuit was unconvinced.125  Rather, the court reiterated
the widespread use of the fingerprint-DNA analogy and found that “a
ing the reasonableness of a search, is the balancing of all interests. See id. (reciting
idea that Fourth Amendment rests on reasonableness of search and seizure).
Thus, the Mitchell court reasoned that the totality of the circumstances test applies
to the contested search and the Fourth Amendment analysis. See id.
118. See id.
119. See id. (reiterating purposes of totality of circumstances test are deter-
mining reasonableness and balancing interests).
120. See id. at 406 (writing collection of DNA under DNA Act requires two
Fourth Amendment searches: physical collection and DNA analysis).
121. See id. (relying on Supreme Court precedent, Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.
Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 616 (1989)).
122. See id. at 406 (concluding DNA testing requires only minimal intrusion
of privacy).  The court relied on the Supreme Court case Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.
Ass’n, stating “The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the ‘intrusion occa-
sioned by a blood test is not significant, since such “tests are a commonplace in
these days of periodic physical examinations and experience with them teaches
that the quantity of blood extracted is minimal, and that for most people the pro-
cedure involves virtually no risk, trauma, or pain.’” Id. at 406–07 (quoting Skinner,
489 U.S. at 625).
123. See id. at 407 (citing United States v. Weikert, 504 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir.
2007)).
124. See id. at 409–10 (rejecting Mitchell’s argument and reiterating analogy
that DNA samples are akin to fingerprints).
125. See id. at 409 (“The District Court agreed [with Mitchell], holding that
‘to compare the fingerprinting process and the resulting identification informa-
tion obtained therefrom with DNA profiling is pure folly.’” (quoting United States
v. Mitchell, 681 F. Supp. 2d 597, 608 (W.D. Pa. 2009))).
15
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DNA profile is used solely as an accurate, unique, identifying marker—in
other words, as fingerprints of the twenty-first century.”126
Because the court determined DNA profiling is merely a form of
identification, its analysis continued by asking to what extent an individual
has an expectation of privacy in his or her identity.127  According to the
court, an arrestee has a lesser expectation of privacy in their identity.128
The court based its conclusion on two ideas: “probable cause to arrest and
the use of fingerprints as a method of identification.”129  The court noted
that once law enforcement found probable cause for arrest, an arrestee’s
identification became “a matter of legitimate state interest.”130  Thus, be-
cause DNA collection occurs after arrest, the arrestee had a diminished
expectation of privacy in his or her own identity.131  The court further
noted that because DNA was only being used for identification, DNA pro-
filing would not invade the diminished privacy interest.132
126. See id. at 409–10 (continuing analysis by citing well-accepted use of DNA-
fingerprint analogy in its “sister circuits”).  The court further strengthened its ar-
gument that DNA is merely being used for identification by explaining the nature
of “junk DNA.” See id. at 410 (“Like fingerprints, ‘at least in the current state of
scientific knowledge, the DNA profile derived from the [individual’s] blood sam-
ple establishes only a record of the [individual’s] identity.’  Given the protections
built into the DNA Act, the Government’s stated practice of only analyzing ‘junk
DNA,’ and the current limits of technology, the information stored in CODIS
serves only an identification purpose.” (citations omitted)).  For a full discussion of
“junk DNA”, see supra note 47 and accompanying text.
127. See id. at 410 (determining issue is degree of privacy individual has in his
or her own identity).
128. See id. at 410–12 (concluding arrestees and pretrial detainees have “di-
minished expectation of privacy” in their identity).  The court again looked closely
at the fingerprint-DNA analogy. See id. at 411 (discussing usefulness of analogy
between DNA and fingerprints).  The court quoted the Fourth Circuit and wrote:
The universal approbation of fingerprints as a method of identifying ar-
restees despite the invasion of privacy “is not surprising when we consider
that probable cause had already supplied the basis for bringing the per-
son within the criminal justice system.  With the person’s loss of liberty
upon arrest comes the loss of at least some, if not all, rights to personal
privacy otherwise protected by the Fourth Amendment.”
Id. at 411 (quoting Jones v. Murray 962 F.2d 302, 306 (4th Cir. 1992)).
129. See id. (writing that diminished expectation of arrestees’ privacy comes
from two principles of probable cause needed for arrest and using DNA for identi-
fication, like fingerprinting).
130. See id. (quoting Jones, 962 F.2d at 306).  The court explained, “We accept
this proposition because the identification of suspects is relevant not only to solv-
ing the crime for which the suspect is arrested, but also for maintaining a perma-
nent record to solve other past and future crimes.” See id. (quoting Jones, 962 F.2d
at 306).
131. See id. at 412 (“DNA collection occurs only after it has been determined
that there is probable cause to believe that the arrestee committed a crime.  In
light of this probable cause finding, arrestees possess a diminished expectation of
privacy in their own identity, which has traditionally justified taking their finger-
prints and photographs.”).
132. See id. (“[B]ecause DNA profiles developed pursuant to the DNA Act
function as ‘genetic fingerprints’ used only for identification purposes, arrestees
16
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On the other side of the totality of the circumstances test, the court
pointed to important law enforcement interests for obtaining DNA sam-
ples from all arrestees.133  The court stated that the interests laid out in
Sczubelek, generally related to “collecting identifying information to aid law
enforcement,” apply equally to arrestees and detainees.134  Accordingly,
the court found that officials have a strong interest in identifying arrestees,
and DNA is a more accurate way to serve that interest.135  Ultimately, the
court wrote that proper identification “assists the Government in accurate
criminal investigations and prosecutions . . . .  Collecting DNA samples
from arrestees can speed both the investigation of the crime of arrest and
the solution of any past crime for which there is a match in CODIS.”136
After looking to Third Circuit precedent, prior circuit holdings, and pub-
lic policy, the court ultimately upheld the 2006 amendments as constitu-
tional, and therefore not a Fourth Amendment violation.137
B. Unresolved Issues and Future Concerns About New Technology
and DNA Testing
While the Third Circuit answered the question regarding the consti-
tutionality of the 2006 amendments, several questions remain unanswered
that could prove significant for practitioners in future litigation.138  First,
the court explicitly refused to rule on the issue of whether DNA could be
constitutionally retained after an individual’s release.139  The limitless test-
ing of each DNA sample under current law aggravates the question of the
constitutionality of DNA retention.140  Second, the court quickly dismissed
the fact that technological advances could allow more significant informa-
tion to be solicited from “junk DNA” samples.141
and pretrial detainees have reduced privacy interests in the information derived
from a DNA sample.”).
133. See id. at 390 (concluding that DNA collection mandated by 2006 DNA
Act serves important law enforcement purposes).
134. See id. at 413 (citing United States v. Sczubelek, 402 F.3d 175, 186 (3d
Cir. 2005)).
135. See id. at 414 (applying valid public policy and state law enforcement
interests to arrestees and detainees).
136. Id. at 414–15.
137. See id. at 415–16 (holding 2006 DNA Act does not violate Fourth Amend-
ment ban on unreasonable searches).
138. For further discussion of the questions left unanswered by Mitchell, see
infra notes 138–69 and accompanying text.
139. See Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 412 (“We leave for another day the question of
whether an individual may challenge the Government’s retention of his DNA sam-
ple or profile.”).  For further discussion of the retention of DNA samples after
release, see infra notes 150–53 and accompanying text.
140. See Eiler, supra note 52, at 1202 (discussing repeated use of each DNA
sample); see also infra notes 144–59 and accompanying text (arguing use of DNA
samples within CODIS may be subject of future litigation).
141. See Mitchell, 622 F.3d at 407 (dismissing defendant’s argument regarding
future use of DNA samples due to its hypothetical nature).  In rejecting Mitchell’s
17
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Upon initial analysis, these issues seem to fit into the current Fourth
Amendment framework.142  However, by explicitly ignoring these ques-
tions, the Third Circuit, along with its sister circuits, has left holes in its
Fourth Amendment analysis.143  Third Circuit practitioners in this area of
the law must acknowledge these gaps and proceed carefully when dealing
with these issues.144
1. Treatment of DNA
The manner in which government agents treat DNA samples could
face constitutional challenges.145  First, any DNA sample within CODIS is
subject to recurring and indeterminate use.146  This means that a single
DNA sample could potentially be analyzed hundreds of times in a day,
comparing every new sample for a possible match.147  Further, a DNA
sample is useful for familial searches, which often lead to further investiga-
tion into an individual’s family background.148  While Mitchell clearly vali-
argument that future advances in DNA technology could alter potential Fourth
Amendment violations of DNA sampling, the Third Circuit wrote:
While we acknowledge the seriousness of Mitchell’s concerns about the
possible misuse and future use of DNA samples, we conclude that these
hypothetical possibilities are unsupported by the record before us and
thus do not have any substantial weight in our totality of the circum-
stances analysis.  Should technological advancements change the value of
“junk DNA,” reconsideration of our Fourth Amendment analysis may be
appropriate.
Id. at 408.
142. For a discussion of the Supreme Court’s most recent case law on the
Fourth Amendment, see supra notes 29–33 and accompanying text.  For a discus-
sion of notable case law on the 2006 amendments, see supra notes 93–111 and
accompanying text.
143. See, e.g., Ashley J. McCarron, Comment, Do the Crime, Serve the Time, Then
Leave Your DNA Behind: United States v. Weikert, 3 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 379,
386 (2007) (stating court’s reluctance to face certain issues portends future
problems in law); see also infra notes 160–69 and accompanying text (arguing cur-
rent Fourth Amendment analysis could come unraveled with future changes).
144. For more information on the importance to practitioners, see infra notes
145–69 and accompanying text.
145. See Linda Bartusiak, Comment, Plea Bargaining for DNA: Implications on the
Right to Privacy, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1115, 1124 (2011) (presenting argument that
indefinite retention of DNA samples may be unconstitutional); see also Eiler, supra
note 52, at 1202 (proposing that repeated use of DNA analysis on single sample
could be constitutional violation).
146. See Eiler, supra note 52, at 1202 (“In the CODIS database, an arrestee’s
DNA profile is subject to repeated and indefinite use by law enforcement officials
across the nation, who perform searches to match unidentified biological evidence
from crime scenes to an individual in the database in hopes of solving a crime.”).
147. See id. (describing repetitive testing allowed with each search of CODIS
database).
148. See Bartusiak, supra note 145, at 1126–27 (explaining familial searches
within CODIS database).  Commentator Linda Bartusiak describes familial
searches as “permit[ting] investigators who find a partial DNA match to use that
person as a ‘pivot,’ or a person who is likely related to the true offender.  Once
police identify a pivot, they can investigate that person’s relatives with greater scru-
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dated the collection and testing of DNA samples, the constitutionality of
recurring DNA tests remains unclear.149
Similarly, there is a question as to whether a DNA sample can be con-
stitutionally retained after a prisoner’s release.150  Several courts, includ-
ing the Third Circuit in Mitchell, refused to discuss this issue.151  While a
prisoner, or even an arrestee, may have a diminished expectation of pri-
vacy that validates initial DNA sampling, this diminished expectation does
not last forever.152  While arrestees have the option to expunge their sam-
ple if charges are dropped, they cannot petition the court for two years
following their arrest.153
Practitioners should be aware of these unresolved issues, for they may
be the subjects of future litigation in this field of law.154  For defense coun-
sel, these ambiguities could be an entry point for a new constitutional
challenge to the DNA Act.155  The court in Mitchell recognized the possi-
bility of future problems with the DNA Act, but refused to expand on cur-
rent Fourth Amendment precedent; in doing so, the court outlined a hole
in current jurisprudence.156  If an individual no longer has a diminished
tiny, despite the absence of any individualized suspicion.” Id. (footnote omitted).
Bartusiak suggests such searches could be beyond the scope of DNA analysis cur-
rently permitted under the Fourth Amendment. See id. (arguing current statutes
need revision to comply with Fourth Amendment).
149. See United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387, 412 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc)
(refusing to address indefinite retention of DNA samples after release), cert. denied,
132 S. Ct. 1741 (2012).
150. See id. (leaving issue of government’s retention of DNA samples for an-
other case); see also United States v. Weikert, 504 F.3d 1, 15 (1st Cir. 2007) (“[W]e
express no opinion on the constitutionality of the retention and searching by the
government of the DNA profiles of individuals who have completed their terms of
conditional release . . . .”).
151. See Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 412 (deferring review of constitutionality of DNA
retention after release); see also Weikert, 504 F.3d at 15 (refusing to determine if
retaining and indefinitely searching DNA samples is constitutional); United States
v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 837–38 (9th Cir. 2004) (limiting analysis to current issue
while denying opportunity to determine whether government may constitutionally
retain samples for DNA profiling).
152. See Bartusiak, supra note 145, at 1124 (arguing that arrestees’ diminished
expectation of privacy may not be diminished forever and such DNA sampling
causes more than initial invasion of privacy).
153. See id. at 1126 (discussing limited nature of expungement and potential
for Fourth Amendment invasions during two year waiting period).  For more infor-
mation on the expungement process, see supra note 46 and accompanying text.
154. See infra notes 155–59 (presenting arguments and issues for future
litigation).
155. See Monteleoni, supra note 33, at 247 (explaining current law allows for
storage of entire genetic codes after release, posing “lifelong risk of abuse” of DNA
sample).
156. See Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 411–13 (arguing arrestee’s diminished expecta-
tion of privacy allows invasions of privacy such as fingerprinting, photographing,
and DNA testing); see also McCarron, supra note 143 at 386 (“In specifically noting
its reluctance to decide the constitutionality of whether retention of DNA profiles
after a conditional releasee is no longer monitored and has paid his debt to soci-
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expectation of privacy, the invasion of privacy from DNA profiling may no
longer be minimal.157  In that case, an individual’s Fourth Amendment
rights may even outweigh any state interests, leading to the breakdown of
the entire analytical framework.158  Prosecutors should also be wary of this
potential issue, which could affect the admissibility of DNA evidence pro-
cured from old and long forgotten samples.159
2. Technological Advancements
The rapid nature of advancing technology also creates uncertainty for
future litigation.160  While courts refused to weigh in on the potential for
future changes to DNA technology, they recognized the possible need for
re-evaluation of the Fourth Amendment analysis.161  Commentators al-
ready argue that “junk DNA” could yield more personal information than
originally believed.162  Most recently, discoveries show that DNA can be
ety, the court acknowledges the bigger issue on the horizon.  There is a tremen-
dous privacy issue at stake when DNA is analyzed and stored.” (footnote omitted)).
157. See Bartusiak, supra note 145, at 1125–26 (expressing concern about pri-
vacy interests and retention of DNA samples for indefinite time periods); see also
Monteleoni, supra note 33, at 270–71 (“[C]riminal DNA database statutes author-
ize retention of DNA profiles and samples long after the search target has left the
criminal justice system and had her full privacy interest restored.  Since the burden
on privacy endures as long as the record is maintained in the government’s
database, there is no reason for the government to be able to ‘tag’ someone while
he is subject to a diminished privacy interest and use this temporary diminution to
burden his privacy for life.” (footnotes omitted)).  If an individual no longer has a
lessened privacy interest, the courts’ current Fourth Amendment analysis no
longer fits. See supra notes 127–32 and accompanying text (explaining court’s
analysis is based on conclusion that state interests outweigh individual rights).
Linda Bartusiak cited the Privacy Act of 1974, which “has ben [sic] interpreted to
prevent federal law enforcement agencies from maintaining dossiers of informa-
tion on individuals not suspected of wrongdoing . . . ,” to oppose expansive DNA
testing of all arrestees. See Bartusiak, supra note 145, at 1125 (arguing Privacy Act is
statutory bar to retention of DNA following release).
158. For a discussion of the significance of the balancing of state interests and
individual rights in this context, see supra notes 127–37 and accompanying text.
159. See generally Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (applying exclusionary
rule to all states and affirming that unconstitutionally obtained evidence is inad-
missible at trial).
160. See generally D.H. Kaye, Please, Let’s Bury the Junk: The CODIS Loci and the
Revelation of Private Information, 102 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 70 (2007) (discuss-
ing debate over usefulness of “junk DNA” and potential threats for litigation).
161. See United States v. Weikert, 504 F.3d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 2007) (“[W]e agree
that, ‘[s]hould the uses to which ‘junk DNA’ can be put be shown in the future to
be significantly greater than the record before us today suggests, a reconsideration
of the reasonableness balance struck would be necessary.’” (alteration in original)
(quoting United States v. Amerson, 483 F.3d 73, 85 n.13 (2d Cir. 2007)).
162. See Kristen Bolden, Note, DNA Fabrication, a Wake Up Call: The Need to
Reevaluate the Admissibility and Reliability of DNA Evidence, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 409,
410 (2011) (analyzing uses of “junk DNA” beyond identification); see also Simon A.
Cole, Is the “Junk” DNA Designation Bunk?, 102 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 54, 57
(2007) (describing how loci used in junk DNA analysis can be used to predict
genetic diseases).
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replicated in a lab through a fairly simple process.163  These innovations
in DNA technology could potentially unravel the analysis based on the
idea that DNA is a simple and more accurate form of a fingerprint.164
While this idea may be based on theoretical possibilities, practitioners
should be aware of the ramifications of changing technology.165  A small
change in the usefulness of “junk DNA” could completely destabilize cur-
rent Fourth Amendment analysis and tip the totality of the circumstances
test in favor of a constitutional challenger.166  Any improvements in the
amount of information obtainable from “junk DNA” would alter the inva-
sion of privacy resulting from DNA testing.167  Further, the replication of
DNA may still seem like a far-fetched idea for many, but the possibility
could disassemble the theory that DNA is more precise and accurate than
fingerprinting.168  In light of these unresolved issues, practitioners could
argue Fourth Amendment review of DNA testing balances on a volatile
scale between apparent stability and total collapse.169
IV. CONCLUSION
The Third Circuit’s decision in Mitchell marked an additional step to-
ward diminished protection for individual Fourth Amendment rights.170
The holding expanded preexisting precedent and protection of the DNA
Act.171  Yet, the court failed to address several issues that could be the
163. See generally Bolden, supra note 162 (explaining realistic possibility of re-
producing human DNA and its impact on use of DNA evidence).
164. See McCarron, supra note 143, at 387 (arguing changes in science could
change value of DNA evidence).
165. See infra notes 166–69 and accompanying text (discussing why technolog-
ical advances are pertinent to future Fourth Amendment law).
166. See United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387, 410–12 (3d Cir. 2011) (en
banc) (using idea that junk DNA only produces limited information, and this is
only minimal intrusion into privacy), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1741 (2012); see also
McCarron, supra note 143, at 387 (arguing potential changes to DNA technology
could alter impact on privacy interests).  One law professor said, regarding the
impact of future DNA technology, “As technology becomes more advanced, to
what extent is the Constitution going to limit the use of technology, and to what
extent are we going to limit the use of technology?”  Anna Stolley Persky, An Arrest-
ing Development: Courts Split over DNA Testing for Those Merely Charged with a Crime, 98
A.B.A. J. 15, 16 (2012) (quoting Thomas Jefferson School of Law Professor David
Steinberg).
167. For a discussion of the legal significance of the idea that “junk DNA”
contains only limited information, see supra notes 124–26 and accompanying text.
168. See Bolden, supra note 162, at 412 (reporting ability to reproduce DNA
may impact DNA testing).  If DNA is easily replicated, the courts may no longer be
able to argue DNA is a more accurate means of identification than fingerprints.
169. For further discussion of the gaps in current Fourth Amendment juris-
prudence and the resulting instability in the law, see supra notes 160–68 and ac-
companying text.
170. For further discussion of Mitchell, see supra notes 116–37 and accompa-
nying text.
171. For an analysis of Mitchell relative to prior precedent, see supra notes
160–69 and accompanying text.
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subject of the next wave of Fourth Amendment challenges.172  Indeed,
future advances in genetic and DNA technology could bring the DNA Act
under constitutional fire once again.173  These uncertainties have the po-
tential to completely destroy prior Fourth Amendment analysis of DNA
profiling laws.174
In light of the amount of litigation surrounding the DNA Act, schol-
ars believe the issue is headed for Supreme Court review.175  Considering
the important public policies advanced by the DNA Act that were recog-
nized by every court undertaking such analysis, the Supreme Court is likely
to agree with the Third Circuit.176  However, if the current status quo of
DNA technology changes, the outcome of a Supreme Court review may
not be so certain.177  Until then, Mitchell governs the 2006 DNA Act’s in-
terpretation, and as DNA science currently stands, our society views the
use of DNA evidence “as a miraculous science capable of exposing untold
individual truths and as a law enforcement tool reserved for solving the
most heinous crimes.”178
172. For an examination of the issues left unanswered following Mitchell, see
supra notes 138–69 and accompanying text.
173. For a discussion of the importance of future developments in DNA tech-
nology, see supra notes 160–69 and accompanying text.
174. For a discussion of the importance of future developments in DNA tech-
nology, see supra notes 160–69 and accompanying text.
175. See Persky, supra note 166, at 16 (“Some legal observers say that the con-
flicting rulings make the issue ripe for U.S. Supreme Court review.”); see also David
H. Kaye, Third Circuit Upholds Federal Arrestee DNA Database Law, DOUBLE HELIX LAW
(July 25, 2011, 5:14 PM), http://www.personal.psu.edu/dhk3/blogs/DoubleHelix
Law/2011/07/third-circuit-upholds-federal-arrestee-dna-database-law.html (urg-
ing Supreme Court to step in on issue).
176. See Persky, supra note 166, at 16 (arguing society’s value in crime solving
is likely to push Supreme Court to side of law enforcement).
177. For an examination of how small changes in DNA technology could sig-
nificantly impact current Fourth Amendment analysis, see supra notes 138–69 and
accompanying text.
178. Preston, supra note 35, at 497.
22
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 57, Iss. 4 [2012], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol57/iss4/5
